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QUANTUM CONSCIOUSNESS:
The Idea of "Soul" in a New Age
by
Karey Perkins
I. Definitions of Consciousness
Consciousness is an enigmatic phenomenon. While we allfeel that we
have it, that we can recognize its absence or presence at least in ourselves, and usually in others (people, animals or things),and that we know what it is, we would be hard pressed to define it. Even the International Dictionary of Psvchologydefines it rather evasively:
The having of perceptions, thoughts and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of confusing consciousness with self-consciousness - to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it. (Sutherland 1989; qtd. in Chalmers 1996)
Chalmers (1996) identifies two conjoined aspects of consciousness in his attempt to describe consciousness. (While he does not claim to "define" consciousness, he does try to "describe" it as he uses the term/concept throughout his work.) One is psychological, that is what the mind does, and that can be described behaviorally, functionally, or neurophysiologically. This description of consciousness usually takes the form of behavioral outputs; or, in the case of functionalism, sensory, even mental inputs as well as outputs; or even, descriptions of specific neurons firing in particular locations of the brain, chemical activities in the brain, and other physical processes the brain undergoes. Chalmers sees little problem with understanding consciousness from a psychological point of view, as it can be physically and empirically understood, tested, confirmed, and verified. The problems arise with a phenomenal view and description of consciousness, the "what it is like," the "qualitative feel," the subjective experience of the individual, which Chalmers calls "almost mystical" (p. 5). Because of the problematic nature of scientifically understanding a mystical entity, most scientists and manY_philosophers want to ignore the phenomenal side of consciousness and feel more comfortable concentrating solely on the psychological side. But Chalmers, and a few others, do consider the phenomenal aspect of consciousness a valid reality that may not be reduced to or equated with physical brain states, and thus take on the task of defining and explaining the existence of a phenomenal entity, consciousness, that seems to have a connection to the physical entity, brain states, and yet also seems metaphysically, qualitatively different from i#.
Chalmers', and others', definitions of consciousness, includes the following characteristics:
Perception
Learning
Memory
Sensing/Feeling: Pain
Emotions: Desire, Anxiety, Angst, Love, Hate, Joy, Sadness, Anger, Peace
Thought
Knowledge
Imagination
Intuition
Will
Self Awareness/Sense of self
Many philosophers are divided as to what items on the above list constitute as consciousness, as to what items "count" as consciousness, as to what items are "necessary" for consciousness, and what items are "sufficient" for consciousness. Thus, if perception, learning and memory are sufficient for consciousness, then we can say that animals have consciousness because most of us would agree that our dog, if we have one, has perception, learning and memory (and some would even say emotions). However, we would be divided as to whether our dog has thought, or even if we acknowledged that, we would stop short of perhaps imagination or intuition.
For Chalmers, perception, learning, and memory, while necessary for consciousness, are not sufficient, for "zombies" can have many of the items on the above list, but still not have consciousness. For Chalmers, to be conscious is to have not just those characteristics that can be described psychologically, but must include the "phenomenal experience" described above. Chalmers does leave out the idea of the soul, or the spirit, perhaps because this language is too religious for a philosophical pursuit (although Francis Crick, Nobel prizewinning scientist, does not shy away from it even in his book's title).
However, the soul or spirit referred to in most religions would certainly include many of the characteristics listed above, and many people would consider consciousness and the soul as co-existent. Among other scientists and philosophers, Rudy Rucker is one who does include the idea of self or soul in consciousness. He divides the individual into three parts: the hardware, that is, the body and the brain; the software, that is, memories, learning, behavior; and consciousness, which he defines as sense of self or personal identity or soul (Casti 328).
II. Mind-Body Problem: Theories
Specifically, the mind-body problem is, how do two seemingly qualitatively different entities, the mind, and the body, that is, the intangible conscious experience and the physical body, interact and affect each other, as they seem to do- How does the mental thought that I have to raise my arm then cause the physical action of my arm being raised- The "how" of this interaction of two completely different substances raises a problem in the view of many philosophers.
A. Theories
Many theories solving the mind-body problem have been developed throughout the centuries, and interestingly, they seem to reflect the prevailing paradigm of their time. Today, the scientific view prevails, so the physicalist view of the mind dominates philosophy today. Following is a somewhat chronological description of the major theories, each of which have more specific versions.
Platonic idealism - Vastly out of favor in the world today, this view of consciousness believes everything is mental; everything is mind or states of minds. The material is a lower manifestation of the mental. The scientific world we live in, with its materialistic bent, does not accept this hypothesis.
Cartesian dualism, metaphysical dualism, or interactionism -- This theory is also out of favor today (although less so) as science has made greater progress in understanding the workings of the brain. Descartes believed that the mental capacity, or soul of man, while it resided in man's brain, was completely separate from the physical, and of a completely different substance than the physical. This created the problem of how the mental and physical, if they are two completely different metaphysical substances, can interact. As we become more and more advanced in neurobiology, and we examine the brain's functioning, we see that through scientific experiment and actual stimulation of subjects' brains, that specific locations of the brain correlate minutely with specific conscious experiences, such as emotions, memories, perceptions. The functioning of the mind seems to be intimately connected to the activity of the physical brain. This has led modern philosophers to eschew Descartes brand of dualism for the following views:
Epinhenomenalism - Consciousness, in both a psychological and phenomenal form, arises from the body, from physical functioning of the brain. It is caused by them, but has no cause on them, cannot affect them. This view has its positive points in that it does not have to explain Me interaction of body and mind, or more exactly, how a mental substance could cause a physical reaction, yet it allows the philosopher to still retain the idea of consciousness as a phenomenal experience.
Behaviorism or Functionalism - The former asserts that mental events are the dispositions to produce behaviors and can be defined/described by the behavioral output evidenced. The latter is more comprehensive, including not only behavioral outputs in its definition of mental events, but inputs as well -whether sensory inputs or mental inputs. Irwin Goldstein (1994) says that "Functionalism is a descendent of behaviorist approaches" and functionalists say a "mental event can be exhaustively described by citing its 'inputs' and 'outputs' (Ellis 16). Ellis explains why scientists and philosophers find behaviorism and functionalism attractive:
Given the undeveloped nature of both neurology and phenomenology, it was no wonder that scientists would opt for something that could be unambiguously and objectively observed and measured ....Since it was impossible to look inside peoples' heads, and subjective reports could not be relied on, what this left was behavior .... (It remained for Thomas Kuhn to point out sixty years later that this kind of objectivity does not lead to as unbiased a theoretical outcome as one might suppose.) (p. 11)
Also, Goldstein (1994:57-61) points out the insufficiency of these views to fully explain consciousness when he says that "When [behaviorists] define 'pain' ....they miss that property that unites different pains and makes them instances of a single kind of experience" (Ellis 16-17). In other words, behaviorism and functionalism are insufficient to capture the consaous, subjective experience of pain.
Identity Theory, physicalism, or Eliminative Materialism: With the progression of science and the understanding of the brain and neural activity, functionalism was taken to its logical conclusion; that is, the physico-chemical brain states are used to explain consciousness. In fact, there is an exact correlation in the physical interaction between brain and consciousness, to the point that brain processes ARE mental states, and, in the case of eliminative materialism, any language that even refers to "mind" and "feelings" and qualitative experience might as well be eliminated. "The scientific belief is that our minds-the behavior of our brains-can be explained by the interactions of nerve cells (and other cells) and the molecules associated with them" (Crick 7). The physicalist view is predominant among many philosophers and scientists today, and given the wide acceptance of a materialist view of the universe, it is hard to refute.
There are critics however who bring up valid objections to the physicalist view of consciousness:
Cognitive theorists .....assume...that the only way to avoid actually denying the existence of consciousness is to postulate that it is 'identical with' its underlying neurophysiological processes... but if that is true, then nothing that can be said about consciousness or intentional processes can possibly add anything to what has already been said when we explained the same outcome in purely mechanistic terms ...every description of a conscious process must be equivalent in meaning to the description of some corresponding physical process. But here again, our experience of our own consciousness presents this consciousness as something that cannot be known or understood through any amount of knowledge of objectively observable physical events. For, no amount of knowledge of the physiological correlates of a headache can ever lead a neurologist to know what a headache feels like unless the neurologist personally has at some point felt something that feels like a headache. (Ellis 24)
The argument here being made against the last two categories of theories is that the subjective experience (qualia) is something qualitatively different from, and impossible to reduce to, the physical world and any objective functioning of the body or mind.
Epiphenomenalism then becomes the last stronghold of the empirical materialist, who is uncomfortable with something as amorphous and mystical as the subjective experience of consciousness, as the self, or soul, but cannot deny that evidence exists -- the personal experience of consciousness -- that consciousness does indeed have a subjective element to it that cannot be defined in, and seems separate from, physical terms. Epiphenomenalism acknowledges the existence of phenomenal consciousness, but denies that it has any affect on the physical world. A nice compromise, but ineffective.
The commonly assumed alternatives to dualism are Epiphenomenalism and theories of strict psychophysical identity. But, many believe that this "oversimplification of the theoretical options constitutes a false limitation of alternatives, if we were to confine ourselves to these options, then there would indeed be an inexorable logic which leads from this starting point to the conclusion that consciousness plays no role in facilitating or producing cognitive functions" (Ellis 5).
III. The Scientific Assumption The reason the latter theories are in favor today is because of the scientific paradigm that dominates our thinking. "The material universe was brought into the scope of human understanding" through the method of scientific discovery which has dominated the past millennium (Butler 3). Prior to that time, the search for knowledge was found through the appeal to authority and systematic theory, which could only proceed so far in uncovering the nature of reality (Powers 82, Butler 3). But with the advent of science, a revolution in human thought occurred. The world became, no longer "capricious and arbitrary" (Butler 3), but rational, composed of "isolated particulars," physical, countable, and testable (Powers 82). The scientific method enabled man to go farther than he ever had before at explaining and understanding the world. Its materialist, empirical method required tangible data for its primary function -investigation into the reality of the physical universe. Because the scientific method is so successful at describing the world and predicting events, other data are then rejected as incompetent to describe the world, or as having little significance or, no reality whatsoever. "Wholeness, harmony, and radiance must give way to repeatability and testability" (Powers 83).
Any data that seems somewhat abstract, universal or ethereal cannot be scientifically investigated, and thus has little value or validity. This results in the elimination and selection of data that does not fit the hypothesis rather than modifying the hypothesis to fit the data, including the elimination of a subjective experience of consciousness in formulating a theory of consciousness. The hypothesis is that all reality is physical entities - and other realms are suspect, even considered by some the product of superstition or the product of outmoded versions of the world, such as religious ones. The mysterious ideas of "meaning" and "purpose" fall to the wayside. "The universe has progressed from an enigmatic metaphysical emblem to the accidental byproduct of superstrings" (Powers 83). So even such a seemingly abstract and obviously non-physical thing such as consciousness is reduced to a physical event that owes its presence to physical happenstance.
The result is that some data and, thus, some theories are eliminated by scientists as they do not conform to the scientific assumptions needed and required for evidence. Ironically, this is a markedly nonscientific way to proceed. "There is something paradoxical in the idea of radical empiricism itself" (Powers 83). In fact, pure objectivity is virtually impossible, and we see this in the |